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Raising the Age of Criminal Responsibility in the Republic of Ireland: 
A Legacy of Vested Interests and Political Expediency 
 
Professor Dermot P.J. Walsh MRIA 
University of Kent 
 
Introduction 
Throughout much of its history, juvenile justice in the Republic of Ireland has been oriented 
towards a justice as distinct from a welfare model.1 It was not until 2001 that the Children 
Act 1908 was finally replaced by a new statutory framework. It offered the promise of a 
more holistic model in which the welfare needs of young offenders could be managed 
without unduly depriving them of due process protections, or exposing them 
inappropriately to the stigmatisation and effects of criminalisation and punishment.2 Only 
five years later, before several of the key measures were even put into effect, it was heavily 
amended pursuant to a justice agenda that emphasised criminalisation and punishment for 
offenders as young as ten years of age. The treatment of the age of criminal responsibility 
has been an integral part of this trajectory. Indeed, the common law exposure of children as 
young a seven years of age to the risk of punishment under the criminal law survived in 
independent Ireland for no less than 85 years. 
Drawing heavily on the parliamentary record, this article examines why the age of criminal 
responsibility should have remained untouched for so long, why there should have been 
such dithering over the reform when it eventually did come and why the current law still 
criminalises children of a very young age. It argues that answers to these questions can be 
found in a volatile combination of religious values and interests, economic and social 
constraints, public intolerance of childhood offending, a lack of principled political 
leadership at the heart of the State and the relative neglect of expert knowledge from the 
behavioural and neuro sciences. Before that, however, it is necessary to outline the relevant 
common law and statutory contexts.  
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Common Law Background 
The common law system is generally believed to have supplanted the ancient Irish Brehon 
law system in Ireland by the seventeenth century.3 By that time, seven years of age was 
taking root as the threshold for criminal responsibility at common law.4 A child older than 
six years and less than fourteen years was deemed to lack the capacity to commit crime, but 
that presumption could be rebutted by proof that the child know what he was doing was 
wrong.5 Holdsworth associated the emergence of a common law defence of infancy with the 
early development of the mens rea concept, in the sense of intent incorporating an element 
of moral wrongdoing.6 Equally, at that time, it began to be accepted that a child under seven 
did not have the capacity to form the mens rea necessary to be guilty of a felony. Blackstone 
linked this more directly to the age when the child acquires a natural capacity to understand 
ƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƌŝŐŚƚĂŶĚǁƌŽŶŐ ?ƐůĂĐŬƐƚŽŶĞŚŝŵƐĞůĨƉƵƚŝƚ ?ƚŚĞĂŐĞ “ǁŚĞŶĨŝƌƐƚ
the understanding mŝŐŚƚŽƉĞŶ ? ?7 Accordingly, he considered that for children under seven 
ǇĞĂƌƐŽĨĂŐĞ “ĂĨĞůŽŶŝŽƵƐĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶŝƐĂůŵŽƐƚĂŶŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŝŶŶĂƚƵƌĞ ? ?/ƚǁŽƵůĚďĞ
tempting, therefore, to link the seven year threshold for criminal liability with the Christian 
or Catholic doctrine that teaches that a child reaches the age of reason at seven years and 
as such is deemed to have a sufficient understanding to commit sin and to be subject to 
ecclesiastical law. It is difficult, however, to find any explicit linkage between the two. 
Indeed, the Code of Canon Law does not refer to the age of reason at all. Instead it refers to 
the use of reason. It was not until 1910 that Pope St. Pius X issued the decree Quam 
Singulari which said that children reached the age of reason around the age of seven, with 
discretion left to the family and priest. While seven years of age was also recognised as 
having significance in terms of natural understanding and legal capacity in some other 
religions, there does not seem to have been any scientific, philosophical or cultural basis for 
the choice. Nevertheless, it seems that the common law also eventually settled on seven 
years of age as the threshold at which a child acquired sufficient reason to ground criminal 
capacity. 
The common law on the age of criminal responsibility was retained without question in 
Ireland post independence.8 Indeed, much of the law and legal process in the old State 
generally was incorporated largely unchanged in the new State.9 This was especially so in 
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the area of juvenile justice.10 Surprisingly, perhaps, the low seven year threshold for criminal 
capacity was never challenged on constitutional grounds. At the very least, it might be 
considered that the expansive interpretation that has been given to the Article 38.1 concept 
of a trial in due course of law would provide a basis for challenging the notion that a child of 
seven years of age could be criminally liable and punished for his or her actions. It may be, 
of course, that suitable opportunities for challenge rarely if ever arose due to a combination 
of the rebuttable presumption of incapacity for those over six years of age and less than 
fourteen years of age, and the reluctance of the State prosecute children as young as seven 
or eight years of age.    
 
Statutory Intervention 
The Children Act 2001, as originally enacted, stipulated that there was a conclusive 
presumption that no child under twelve years of age was capable of committing a criminal 
offence.11 This was complemented by a rebuttable presumption that a child who is not less 
than twelve years of age but under fourteen years of age was incapable of committing a 
criminal offence because the child did not have the capacity to know that the act or 
omission concerned was wrong.12 These provisions retained the general common law 
approach to incapacity, but raised the age threshold for it by a very substantial five years. 
This meant that a child below the age of twelve years would be immune from 
ĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĨŽƌŚŝƐŽƌŚĞƌ ?ŽĨĨĞŶĚŝŶŐ ? ?although there was 
provision for the public Health Boards to intervene compulsorily in certain circumstances in 
ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨŚŝƐŽƌŚĞƌǁĞůĨĂƌĞ ?dŚĞƌĞďƵƚƚĂďůĞƉƌĞƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨĂĐŚŝůĚ ?Ɛ
incapacity was retained for children of twelve and thirteen years of age, but could be 
rebutted by proof that the child knew his or her act or omission was wrong, as distinct from 
the higher common law requirement of seriously wrong.    
Without ever having been brought into effect, these reforms were replaced in 2006 by the 
current provisions which take a distinctly different approach to the age of criminal 
responsibility. In contrast to their predecessor and the common law, they do not set an age 
threshold below which a child is deemed wholly incapable of committing a criminal offence. 
Instead they stipulate that, subject to specified exceptions, a child less than twelve years of 
age shall not be charged with a criminal offence.13 The exceptions are: murder, 
manslaughter, rape, rape under section 4 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990 
or aggravated sexual assault. The protection against being charged with any of these 
offences only applies to a child less than ten years of age.14 The net effect is that a child of 
ten years of age can be charged, prosecuted, convicted and punished for any of these 
serious offences, while a child less than twelve years of age cannot be charged with any 
offence. Critically, the old rebuttable presumption that had applied between the ages of 
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seven and fourteen years is abolished.15 In its place is a general provision to the effect that 
in any case where a child below the age of 14 years is charged with an offence, no further 
proceedings in the matter, apart from remand in custody or on bail, can be taken except by 
or with the consent of the DPP.16 
The wording of the current statutory provisions is striking. For the first time in the history of 
Irish law, it dispenses with a clear statement of principle that a child below a specified age is 
deemed incapable of committing a criminal offence. This ancient precept is replaced by a 
functional stipulation to the effect that a child below a certain age cannot be charged with 
an offence. In other words, it adopts the formulation familiar to Scottish law and many 
European civilian procedures that operate in a different context.17 What is not so clear is 
whether the conclusive common law presumption of incapacity for children below the age 
of seven years is also abolished. The wording in the 2001 Act, as originally enacted, left no 
doubt that the intention was simply to raise the common law age threshold to twelve years; 
the automatic implication being that a child below the age of 12 years lacked the capacity to 
commit a criminal offence. The wording of its 2006 replacement, however, is more 
ambiguous. Not only does it introduce the concept of different age thresholds for different 
offences, but it also drops the language of criminal incapacity in favour of the language of 
protection against being charged. The common law incapacity attaching to children below 
the age of seven years is not expressly abolished. It is just ignored. It can be argued, of 
course, that it is implicitly replaced by the introduction of the statutory provisions. It can 
equally be argued, however, that there is no inherent incongruity in saying that a child 
below the age of seven years lacks capacity to commit a criminal offence while, at the same 
time, stipulating that a child below the age of twelve years (or ten years, as the case may be) 
cannot be charged with a criminal offence. The latter does not necessarily entail the demise 
of the former.      
Even if the common law capacity threshold has not been abolished, it seems clear that Irish 
criminal law has at least retreated from express recognition of a concept of childhood 
innocence, in the sense of a child of a very young age lacking the inherent capacity to 
commit crime. Instead, such children are viewed as the equivalent of adults in terms of 
criminal capacity, and their distinctive status and vulnerability are catered for merely by a 
procedural bar on their being charged with a criminal offence so long as they are below the 
age of ten or twelve ǇĞĂƌƐĚĞƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞ “ŽĨĨĞŶĐĞ ? ?dŚĞŶĞƚĞĨĨĞĐƚŝƐƚŚĂƚǁŚĞƌĞĂĐŚŝůĚ
of, for example, seven or eight years of age (or even younger if the common law threshold 
has been implicitly abolished) acts in a manner that could constitute a criminal offence, the 
unseemly spectacle of the child being prosecuted and punished through the criminal law is 
avoided onůǇŽŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĂůďĂƌŽŶďĞŝŶŐĐŚĂƌŐĞĚ ?dŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĐĂŶƐƚŝůůďĞĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĞĚĂƐ ?ĐƌŝŵŝŶĂů ?ĨŽƌŽƚŚĞƌŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƌĞĐŽƌĚƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ?ǁŝƚŚĂůůƚŚĞ
consequences that that can have for the status of the child. Indeed, the change effected in 
2006 expressly provides for children of ten and eleven years of age to be admitted to the 
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Garda Juvenile Diversion Programme for young offenders. Similarly, children in these age 
categories ĐĂŶďĞƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ'ĂƌĚĂŝǀĞƌƐŝŽŶWƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞĨŽƌ ?ŽĨĨĞŶĚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚĂŶƚŝ-social 
ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ŝƚŝƐŶŽǁĞǆƉƌĞƐƐůǇƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚƚŚĂƚĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨĂĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚŝŶ
the Diversion Programme is admissible for sentencing purposes in the event of subsequent 
criminal proceedings against the child.18 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, under the 
current regime, the age old acceptance that children below a certain age are simply too 
ŝŶŶŽĐĞŶƚƚŽďĞĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƚĂŐ ?ĐƌŝŵŝŶĂů ? ?ŚĂƐŐŝǀĞŶǁĂǇƚŽĂƉŽƉƵůĂƌĚĞŵĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ
they should at least be stigmatiƐĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌ ?ĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ?ĞǀĞŶŝĨŝƚŝƐŶŽƚĂƉƉƌŽŝĂƚĞƚŽ
prosecute and punish them for it through the criminal process.  This aspect is pursued 
further below. 
A further devious twist in the wording of the current law is that it does not actually provide 
a child, no matter how young, with an explicit and absolute protection against being 
charged, prosecuted and punished in respect of a criminal offence. The statutory provision 
in question states that a child under the age of twelve years, or ten years (as the case may 
be), shall not be charged with a criminal offence. Clearly, it is framed in terms of the age of 
the child when charged, as distinct from the age of the child when he or she committed the 
 “ŽĨĨĞŶĐĞ ? ?/ŶŽƚŚĞƌǁŽƌĚƐ ?ŝƚĚŽĞƐŶŽŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶƉƌŽƚĞct a child being charged with an 
offence while the child is below the age of twelve (or ten) years. It does not positively 
protect a child who has reached his twelfth (or tenth) birthday from being charged, 
convicted and punished for a criminal offence committed when he was less than twelve (or 
ten) years of age. 
The current provisions clearly reflect a less tolerant view of offending by young children 
than their predecessors which had never actually been brought into force. The factors that 
produced this result were also active in sustaining the common law threshold on the age of 
criminal responsibility for 85 years.  
 
Religious, Social and Economic Factors Sustaining the Common Law Threshold  
The fact that the common law threshold survived in Ireland until 2006 is surprising given 
that it had been raised to ten in England and Wales in 1963 and in Northern Ireland in 1968. 
The regular practice of criminal law reforms in these neighbouring jurisdictions being 
adopted some years later in the Republic of Ireland clearly did not extend to the age of 
criminal responsibility. This suggests that the low common law threshold was deeply rooted 
in the indigenous social and cultural values. Significantly, when the Children Act 1934 was 
introduced to extend supervisory safeguards for orphaned children in private care homes 
from seven year olds to nine year olds, there was no mention in the parliamentary debates 
of raising the age of criminal responsibility in line with the recent increase to eight in 
England and Wales in 1933. This is despite the fact that the 1934 Act had clearly been lifted 
from a part of the U.K. Act that also raised the age of criminal responsibility. The silence is 
even more striking given that, when introducing the measure in parliament, the 
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 Children Act 2001, s.48(2), as substituted by Criminal Justice Act 2006, s.126. For criticisms of these aspects, 
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Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Health actually said that the age for local 
ƐƵƉĞƌǀŝƐŽƌǇĐŽŶƚƌŽůǁĂƐďĞŝŶŐƌĂŝƐĞĚĨƌŽŵƐĞǀĞŶǇĞĂƌƐƚŽŶŝŶĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞƐĞǀĞŶ “ǁĂƐĂƌĂƚŚĞƌ
ƚĞŶĚĞƌĂŐĞƚŽƌĞůĞĂƐĞƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝǀĞƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞĐƚ ? ?19  
With respect to Ireland of the 1920s through to at least the 1970s, it is easy to draw a 
correlation between this unquestioning acceptance of the seven year threshold with 
Catholic teaching and religious practice. Not only was the religious affiliation  and identity of 
the populace overwhelmingly Catholic,20 but the management of mainstream schooling was 
also dominated by the Catholic Church and Catholic religious orders.21 These factors 
combined potently in admission to the Catholic sacrament of the Eucharist. Known generally 
ĂƐƚŚĞ ?&ŝƌƐƚŽŵŵƵŶŝŽŶ ? ?ŝƚŚĂĚĂĐĞŶƚƌĂůƉůĂĐĞŝŶƚŚĞůŝǀ ƐŽĨŵŽƐƚǇŽƵŶŐĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐĂŶĚƉƌŝŵĂƌǇƐĐŚŽŽůƐ ?ƌŝƚŝĐĂůůǇ ?ƚŚĞ ?&ŝƌƐƚ
ŽŵŵƵŶŝŽŶ ?ǁĂƐƐǇŶŽŶǇŵŽƵƐǁŝƚŚĂĐƋƵŝƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇto reason, in the sense of being 
able to distinguish between right and wrong (often taught in the schools as reaching the age 
of reason). So universal and familiar was this teaching and practice at all levels of Irish 
society and parts of the country, that it is easy to see how the age of seven would have been 
accepted unquestioningly as the natural threshold for exposing children to punishment not 
just for sin, but also for crime. 
 
It can also be argued that there were certain religious-based vested interests in maintaining 
a low age of criminal responsibility in Ireland, at least throughout the early decades of the 
^ƚĂƚĞ ?ƐĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ?/ŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂů ?ĂŶĚƌĞĨŽƌŵĂƚŽƌǇ ?ƐĐŚŽŽůƐǁŚŝĐŚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚŝŽŶ and 
education, and generally stood in loco parentis for certain categories of vulnerable young 
children, were almost wholly owned and managed by religious orders.22 The children 
committed to them were orphaned or destitute or were convicted and sentenced in 
criminal matters. Critically, the school owners were paid a subvention for each child 
detained in their school. Accordingly, the children were a valuable and necessary source of 
income for the religious orders in respect of their own maintenance and that of the 
properties concerned. A rare estimates debate on the annual subvention revealed a concern 
that the financial viability of the schools, and by extension, the religious orders who owned 
and managed them, was threatened by the courts not sentencing enough young children to 
be detained in them. This was reflected starkly in the following contribution from one 
member: 
 “/ŬŶŽǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨďŽǇƐƚŚĂƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŝŶ'ůĞŶĐƌĞĞ [Reformatory], and in 
other schools, should not be 76, but should be 700. It would be better to have them 
there for the reason that they would be taken away from their present surroundings, 
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where they have little but bad example before them. Their parents, perhaps, may be 
people who are sent to jail occasionally, or it may be that their parents are 
drunkards, as unfortunately too often is the case. It is unfortunate that magistrates 
should take the view that so many of them do take in dealing with boys of this class. 
If you had 700 pupils in those schools you would not be faced with the financial 
position that you are in to-day. That financial position has largely been brought 
about by the unfortunate attitude of mind of both parents and magistrates to these 
ƐĐŚŽŽůƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞƌĞĂůůǇǀĞƌǇĞƐƚŝŵĂďůĞƐĐŚŽŽůƐ ? ?23 
More than ten years later, a member of the Dail, speaking in the debates on the Children Bill 
1940, observed more bluntly: 
   “/ŚĂǀĞŚĞĂƌĚŝƚƐĂŝĚďǇƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞƉĞŽƉůĞĂƚŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐŽĨƉƵďůŝĐďŽĚŝĞƐŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŝƚǇ
[Dublin] that children were very often committed to these institutions not so much 
because it was felt that it was in their own interest to commit them, but because it 
ǁĂƐǀĞƌǇŐŽŽĚĨŽƌƚŚĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? ?24  
 
Obviously, the lower the age of criminal responsibility, the greater the flow of child 
 ?ŽĨĨĞŶĚĞƌƐ ? ?ĂŶĚĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚŝŶĐŽŵĞ ?ƚŽ the industrial schools. Disturbingly, criminal law and 
practice seemed to bend too readily in favour of fuelling a steady supply of both from the 
State to the religious orders. The law afforded District Court judges very broad discretion in 
ordering young offenders to be detained in these schools for very long periods.25 Despite 
some of concerns expressed in the 1925 estimates debate, too many judges were too willing 
to commit young children convicted of minor offences to detention in the schools for very 
long periods, purportedly in the interests of their social, educational, moral and social 
development. In the course of the debate, for example, one member raised the case of a 
ten year old child from a stable family who was ordered to be detained until he was sixteen 
after being convicted of breaking into a paper shop with others to get fuel for a bonfire to 
celebrate a local election victory.26 Another case highlighted in the Dail during these years 
concerned the sentencing of four children for a minor act of vandalism in which electrical 
insulators worth about £2 each were broken. For these offences, two 14 year old children 
were ordered to be detained in a reformatory for five years, while an 11 year old and a nine 
year old child were each ordered to be detained in an industrial school for three years. An 
appeal for intervention from the Minister met with a cold and dismissive response to the 
effect that such action was necessary to deter boys from engaging in breaking insulators in 
the area.27  
 It would be unfair, however, to paint a picture of church and State conspiring to use the 
criminal law and justice system as a source of financial maintenance for the religious orders.  
The sad reality is that in the early decades of the State, some families were so desperate 
that they coveted the consignment of one or more of their young children to an industrial 
school. They considered that the food, accommodation and education on offer there would 
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far outweigh the life-threatening destitution that would be their lot within the family. 
Accordingly, it was not uncommon for parents to engineer the conviction of their own 
children for petty offences, such as begging, in the hope that they would be convicted and 
sentenced to detention in an industrial school.28  
 
Emergent of Voices for Reform 
It was not until the 1960s and 1970s that disparate voices in favour of raising the age of 
criminal responsibility began to surface in Ireland. For the most part, these were confined 
primarily to academics, practitioners and individuals or bodies commissioned to carry out 
research on the juvenile justice system. The most substantial of these was surely the 
Kennedy Committee which was established in 1967 by the Minister for Education to 
examine the industrial and reformatory school system. It reported in 1970 with wide 
ranging reforms based on extensive research and rigorous reasoning,29 as befits its able and 
experienced membership.30 Among its many weighty recommendations, which have stood 
the test of time, is that the age of criminal responsibility should be increased to 12 years and 
that a civil, welfare based, procedure should be introduced to address the needs of children 
ǁŚŽ ?ŽĨĨĞŶĚ ?ďĞůŽǁƚŚĂƚĂŐĞ ?31 Significantly, this recommendation was not based on a 
simple linkage with thresholds in neighbouring and many other European jurisdictions  
where the minimum age had been significantly higher than that in Ireland for many years. 
Instead the Committee conducted a thorough and sophisticated analysis into the causes of 
juvenile delinquency. It concluded that the most important causal factors were the 
personality and emotional development of the individual juvenile. Sadly, as will be seen 
later, this is the vital aspect that seems to have been lost when the State finally managed to 
reform the law on the age of criminal responsibility.   
The case for an increase in the age of criminal responsibility was also made in various other 
reports, studies and papers over the next few decades.32 The elected members of 
Parliament, however, were initially more reticent in highlighting the issue, preferring to 
follow rather than lead. The first significant Dail debate was triggered accidentally in 1984 
by a misunderstanding on the part of some members with respect to the likely application 
to young children of what was to become the Criminal Justice Act 1984. This Act introduced, 
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for the first time in Ireland, a general police power to detain arrested suspects for the 
investigation for crime, along the lines of PACE in Britain. Unnerved by the prospects of 
children of 7 and 8 years of age being detained for investigation in Garda custody, some 
members forced a debate on an amendment seeking to raise the age of criminal 
responsibility to at least 12 years of age. While the amendment was lost, the debate did 
seem to reflect a broad consensus among the members that the age of criminal 
responsibility was too low at seven years of age. Perhaps more significant, in light of future 
developments, were the implicit indications of a lack of consensus on what the age should 
be and on how it should be achieved. As will be seen below, many members voiced 
concerns about what they viewed as the criminal behaviour of children of nine, ten and 
eleven year of age, and strongly favoured the application of harsh punitive measures to deal 
with it. In 1986, the Dail Select Committee on Crime, Lawlessness and Vandalism displayed a 
lack of conviction on raising the age of criminal responsibility when it opted not to make 
recommendations after having reviewed the law on it.33 Similarly, in 1988, on the first 
occasion that a concrete legislative proposal was put before the Dail, it generated 
protestations of consensus on the need to raise the age but no political will to deliver on 
it.34 
 It was not until 1992 that a Dail Select Committee on Crime felt sufficiently confident to 
recommend raising the age of criminal responsibility.35  By that time, however, there was a 
general expectation that the government was set to bring forward legislative proposals to 
raise the age. In the event those proposals did not see the light of day until 1996 and, as 
indicated above, it was a full ten years later in 2006 before the age was raised in effect. 
Clearly, underneath the apparent consensus among the experts and parliamentarians, there 
were strong undercurrents moving in the opposite direction. 
 
Latent Forces Impeding Reform  
Although the age of criminal responsibility was eventually raised in 2006, initial attempts 
within government to formulate legislative proposals to that end actually commenced 25 
years earlier in 1981. The apparent consensus on the need for reform that emerged in the 
course of the 1980s concealed an underlying lack of agreement on the shape that that 
reform should take. Permeating the latter was a volatile combination of religious, social, 
economic and political forces that were not conducive to a simple raising of the incapacity 
to commit crime from seven years to a significantly higher level. These forces were not 
always visible or consistent. It may also be no exaggeration to say that some powerful 
political sources maintained a hypocritical public image of support for raising the age, while 
privately working to frustrate it. Ultimately, the net effect of these negative forces was not 
just a delay for more than two decades, but also a significant dilution of the substance of 
the initial proposals. 
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Much of the initial delay in bringing forward concrete legislative proposals on raising the age 
of criminal responsibility can be attributed directly ƚŽĂŵŝǆƚƵƌĞŽĨŽůĚĨĂƐŚŝŽŶĞĚ ?ƚƵƌĨ ?ǁĂƌƐ
and administrative disharmony behind the scenes within the relevant government 
departments. Traditionally, juvenile justice entailed overlap between the Departments of 
Justice and Education, while the Department of Health dealt with the care needs of children 
outside of the criminal justice system. Raising the age of criminal responsibility to ten or 12 
or higher, would present difficult questions of how to deal with the significant numbers of 
such children who were engaged in serious and, in some cases, persistent, offending. Some 
means of facilitating compulsory intervention for the care and welfare of these children 
would have to be provided. This, in turn, raised issues of whether and, if so, how Ireland 
should implement mechanisms such as the civil judicial hearings applicable to young 
offenders for eight to 12 years of age in Scotland,36 or equivalent mechanisms familiar in 
many European continental jurisdictions.37 The three government departments failed to 
reach a coherent position on how these aspects should be addressed and managed. The net 
result was that legislative proposals on child care and juvenile justice were separated. The 
former were introduced in Parliament in the form of a Child Care and Protection Bill 1985, 
which was not actually enacted until 1991. It took another five years, and the establishment 
ŽĨĂƐŝŶŐůĞĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŶŐDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞǁŝƚŚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐĂĨĨĂŝƌƐŝŶĞĂĐŚŽĨ
the three departments, before legislative proposals on juvenile justice first appeared in 
Parliament.38 
The pervasive, albeit indirect, influence of the Catholic Church can be detected in the 
obstructionism faced by the Child Care and Protection Bill. Critically, the Bill included 
provision for the essential welfare-based measures needed to cope with young offenders 
who would be put beyond the reach of the criminal justice system by a significant raising of 
the age of criminal responsibility. This entailed conferring civil powers on the State to take 
children away from families in situations where the child was not at risk or orphaned or 
destitute. Just how controversial that would prove to be is indicated by the special status 
afforded the sanctity of the family by the Constitution. Reflecting the influence of the 
Catholic Church,39 ƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŝƉƵůĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ ?ƚ ?ŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƐƚŚĞ
Family as the natural primary and fundamental unit group of Society, and as a moral 
institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all 
ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞůĂǁ ? ?&ĂĐĞĚǁŝƚŚƐƵĐŚƉŽǁĞƌĨƵů ?ĂďƐŽůƵƚĞĂŶĚƚƌĞŶĐŚĂŶƚůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?ŝƚǁĂƐĂůǁĂǇƐ
going to be difficult for the State to secure the powers and establish the civil process 
necessary to override parental authority to the extent of removing a child from the family in 
the interests of his or her own welfare and development. It is no surprise, therefore, that it 
took six years and several diversions before the 1985 child care measures even made it to 
the statute book.  
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especially chs.3 and 4. 
The potential economic costs of the welfare supports that would have to be provided to 
manage the increase in underage child offenders also proved a potent factor in shaping the 
content and progress of the legislative proposals. Ireland in the 1980s lacked the 
infrastructure and resources necessary to provide the appropriate facilities and services. As 
noted above, it had always relied heavily on the resources of the church and the voluntary 
private sector to provide the accommodation, social and education needs of children 
sentenced to detention or committed to care. Raising the age of criminal responsibility was 
likely to force the State to invest heavily in providing the necessary supports. This was a 
prospect that many in the political establishment were loathe to entertain.   
 
The other potent factor affecting the progress and content of the proposals to raise the age 
of criminal responsibility was public opinion. The nature and extent of offending by children 
as young as ten years of age was an issue of acute public concern throughout the 1980s and 
1990s and beyond. While it may not have reached the levels necessary to satisfy all of the 
criteria for a  ?moral panic ?, there was a deep sense of public alarm and anger at the 
ƉƌĞǀĂůĞŶĐĞŽĨ ?ũŽǇƌŝĚŝŶŐ ? ?ŐůƵĞ-sniffing, vandalism, and anti-social behaviour, all of which 
were associated in the public mind with children out of control in parts of the urban centres. 
The media reporting of such activities produced an effect similar to that generated in the 
United Kingdom in the wake of the killing of toddler Jamie Bolger by two ten year old boys.40 
Indeed, there was also a spill over effect in Ireland of the media reporting of that killing. Not 
surprisingly, in this toxic environment, suggestions to increase the age of criminal 
responsibility was always likely to provoke fears among the communities affected that they 
would be left powerless and abandoned in the face of young criminals who would be above 
and beyond the reach of the law.41 These fears were reflected in the content and tone of 
the contributions from their elected representatives to the debates from the mid 1980s 
through the 1990s and beyond on each occasion that proposals were tabled to increase the 
age of criminal responsibility. While they generally accepted the argument that seven was 
too low, they needed re-assurance that any move to increase it would be marginal and/or 
would be accompanied by alternative control mechanisms. This position was captured 
neatly by the Minister of State at the Department of Health when, in responding to a 
proposal to raise the age of criminal responsibility to 12 years in the course of the debates 
in the Child Care Bill 1988, he said:   
  “If we agree to provide in law that children under 14 years are not capable of committing 
crimes, there would be widespread public concern at the prospect of youngsters committing 
anti-ƐŽĐŝĂůĂĐƚƐĂŶĚŶŽƚďĞŝŶŐƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽĂŶǇĨŽƌŵŽĨƉƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŽƌƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?42  
And later 
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  “I think that the man in the street would be appalled at the suggestion that such youngsters 
could not be prŽƐĞĐƵƚĞĚ ? ?43 
 
dŚĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƚŚĂƚŝƚǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞĨŽƌĐŚŝůĚŽĨĨĞŶĚĞƌƐ
between the ages of seven and fourteen years to be managed solely through a civil, welfare 
based, process. There also had to be an element of just desserts and overt punishment. This 
reflected a strong current of Irish public opinion that was intolerant of childhood offending 
and wedded to the need to discipline children severely in order to steer them away from 
wrongdoing (and its close association with sin) at a young and impressionable age. The 
emphasis was very much on discipline through corporal punishment coupled with the 
application of a rigorous education and lifestyle regime aimed at self-improvement and the 
production of obedient children in the image of the traditional Irish Catholic model of the 
child. Once again, the dominant influence of Catholic religious forces within the family and 
the State was both apparent and real. As noted above, the State relied heavily on the 
religious orders, through their industrial (and reformatory) schools to shoulder the burden 
of rehabilitating very young offenders and steering them away from criminal and anti-social 
behaviour. Corporal punishment was a regular instrument for imposing discipline in those 
schools and in the mainstream schools, most of which were either owned by religious 
orders or managed by the church.44 It was not formally prohibited by law in the detention 
schools until 2007. 
 
These values came to the surface in the parliamentary process in debates on juvenile crime 
and justice in the 1990s. In an adjournment debate on the lack of secure accommodation for 
young offenders, for example, a future Minister for Justice, who would later oversee the 
enactment of the Children Act 2001 said:  
 “[The] time has come for us to provide adequate detention facilities for young 
offenders. They are now getting the same simple and lucid message as hardened 
criminals: if one commits a serious criminal offence, the punishment will not fit the 
crime. I believe that, not only in this case but in the case of virtually everybody who 
has the use of reason, there is a crying and desperate need for this State to tell those 
who commit serious crimes that the punishment will fit the crime and that if they 
commit a serious criminal offence, not only will they go to prison or a place of 
detention but they will stay there until they have served their debt to society or be 
made an example of to others who might be ŽĨůŝŬĞŵŝŶĚ ? ?45  
Previously, in the debates on the Criminal Justice Bill 1983, several members attributed 
juvenile crime to the demise of corporal punishment in the schools, and called for the return 
of birching and the introduction of army type detention ĐĂŵƉƐĂƐ “ǇŽƵŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞŶĞĞĚ
ĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞ ? ?46 
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This public opinion context helps to explain why it took so long for concrete legislative 
proposals on raising the age of criminal responsibility to be brought forward by government 
in Ireland. It also helps explain the slow and torturous journey of those proposals into law at 
a time when, at least superficially, it appeared that there was a general consensus on the 
need to raise the low age threshold. This journey was further complicated by the arguably 
duplicitous approach of the largest political party and its allies in Parliament. 
 
Political Expediency 
The remarkable legislative journey that eventually culminated in a raising of the age of 
criminal responsibility began with the Children Bill 1996 introduced by a Fine Gael and 
Labour coalition government.  Constrained by public opinion and the limited financial 
resources of the Health Boards to cope with the extra offenders outside of the criminal 
justice system, it adopted ten years of age as the threshold for criminal responsibility.47 
Critically, it did this simply by extending to ten years of age the existing conclusive 
presumption that children below seven years of age lacked the capacity to commit crime.48 
Offenders below ten years of age would be dealt with by the Health Boards wholly outside 
the criminal justice system on an exclusively welfare basis. The conclusive presumption was 
accompanied by a rebuttable presumption that a child from ten years to 13 years of age 
inclusive was incapable of committing a criminal offence because he or she did not know 
the act or omission concerned was wrong.  
Although the proposal was generally welcomed as a long overdue step in the right direction, 
underneath the superficial consensus lurked an embedded, but largely unspoken, resistance 
within the Fianna Fail and Progressive Democrat opposition parties. Fianna Fail failed to 
cooperate with the government in moving the Bill on to the Committee stage and so it had 
progressed no further when the government collapsed in June 1997. Under pressure from 
the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,49 the Bill was reintroduced by the new Fianna 
Fail  ? Progressive Democrat coalition in February 1998 with an actual increase in the age of 
criminal responsibility to twelve years. Nevertheless, the government continued to drag its 
heels in the matter and debate on the Bill did not resume until February 2001. When it was 
finally enacted in July 2001, the Minister of State at the Department of Health and Children, 
this meant that children under the age of twelve would no longer have the capacity to 
commit a criminal offence. and public intolerance of serious crime being committed by ten 
and eleven year olds.50 
                                                          
47




 It also included provision to keep the age threshold under review with a view to raising it to 12 years when 
economic resources would allow. 
49
 7KH81&RPPLWWHHFRQVLGHUHG,UHODQG¶VILUVWUHSRUWLQ-DQXDU\,WZDVKLJKO\FULWLFDORIWKHSURSRVHGWHQ
year old threshold, and emphasised a preference for a minimum of twelve years of age; Committee on the Rights 
of the Child, Concluding Observations: Ireland CRC/C/15/Add.85, para.23. In 2005, the Minister of State for 
Children openly acknowledged that the twelve year threshold in the 2001 Act was adopted to appease the U.N. 
Committee; Seanad Debates Vol.181, No.70, 1516 (16 November 2005).    
50
 See Debate on juvenile offenders motion; Seanad Debates Vol.181, No.70 (16 November 2005).  
Nevertheless, these sentiments were to prove false as the provisions were never brought 
into effect, purportedly because of their financial costs and public intolerance of serious 
crime being committed by ten and eleven year olds.51 As explained above, they were 
replaced in 2006 replaced by another Fianna Fail  ? Progressive Democrats coalition with a 
version that resonated an overtly justice oriented approach to the management of very 
young child offenders. 
The manner in which the current provisions was introduced can only be described as 
extraordinary and bordering on the undemocratic. It seems that the superficial consensus 
that produced the 2001 Act was swept aside in an underhand manner by those latent 
reactionary forces that were never fully supportive of the 2001 consensus.52 The vehicle was 
a Criminal Justice Bill from 2004 that was still making its way through the legislative process 
in 2006. After that Bill had completed its second reading, the Minister for Justice stunned 
the Dail by announcing his intention to introduce a whole raft of substantive amendments 
on Committee stage. These were so substantive and voluminous that they dwarfed the 
original bill. Critically, they embraced major innovatory and draconian measures to tackle 
organised crime, violent offences, drug-trafficking and firearms offences, as well as major 
changes and additions to the Children Act 2001. As seen above, the changes included a 
significant re-writing of the provision in the 2001 Act on the age of criminal responsibility. In 
any normal democratic process, these changes to the Children legislation would have been 
introduced and debated as a separate Bill. Lumping them in with the draconian provisions 
on gangland crime ensured that they would largely escape parliamentary scrutiny as 
attention would focus on the other measures, given that there was something of a media 
ĚƌŝǀĞŶ ?ŵŽƌĂůƉĂŶŝĐ ?ŽǀĞƌŐĂŶŐůĂŶĚĐƌŝŵĞĂƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞ ? Not surprisingly, that is exactly what 
happened as, in the deďĂƚĞƚŚĂƚĨŽůůŽǁĞĚƚŚĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂŵĞŶĚŵĞŶƚƐ ?
ŽŶůǇŽŶĞŵĞŵďĞƌŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞƚƌĞĂƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ juvenile justice principles 
in the 2001 Act. 
The undemocratic effects of this strategy were compounded by the manner in which the 
ministerial team obscured, and even distorted, the substance of the changes in the age of 
ĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?dŚĞ ?:ĂŵŝĞŽůŐĞƌ ?ĐĂƐĞǁĂƐĐĂůůĞĚŝŶĂŝĚŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞĂŐĞ
of criminal responsibility from twelve years in the 2001 Act to ten years in respect of certain 
of the most serious offences (see below). When challenged on the relevance of the case in 
Ireland, the Minister resorted to grossly exaggerated scenarios which simply would not 
occur under the measures enshrined in the 2001 Act as originally enacted. He said: 
  “dŚĞƌĞŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĂĨĞǁĐĂƐĞƐŽĨƐĞǆƵĂůŽĨĨĞŶĐĞƐŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐŵŝŶŽƌƐ ?ƐŽůŝĚĐŝƚŝǌĞŶ
could wake up one morning to realise that the young boy who had raped his or her 
daughter was going back to school that day and there would be a conference, or that 
a person who pushed his or her child under a train or into a canal was back at school, 
or that a person had bullied and tortured a person. If our law was such that these 
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people would be given a mere slap on the wrist and told to get on with the rest of 
their lives, public opinion would be outraged. ?53    
Moreover, no mention was made of the significant shift from replacing the conclusive 
presumption that a child under twelve years of age lacked the capacity to commit an 
offence, with protection against being charged with an offence (see below). No explanation 
was given for the abolition of the rebuttable presumption. Most cynically, these changes 




Raising the age of criminal responsibility in the Republic of Ireland has proved a surprisingly 
difficult endeavour. The view of criminalisation and punishment as essential, even natural, 
tools for dealing with offending by young children was so deeply rooted in Irish society that 
it was the 1980s before a consensus began to emerge on the need to raise the age from the 
common law low of seven years. The laboured attempts to implement that consensus over 
the next 25 years are a testament to the strength and depth, and ultimate success, of forces 
wedded to the more traditional view of childhood and punishment. Contrary to the 
threshold promoted as a minimum by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, children 
from ten years of age in Ireland are subject fully to the criminal law and punishment for the 
most serious crimes. While it may appear that children below twelve years of age are 
beyond the reach of the criminal law, the reality is that they too are not fully immune from 
its effects. 
A disappointing feature of the policy debates on the subject in Ireland over the past thirty 
years is that they have not been embraced, or even engaged with, the body of expert 
knowledge on the development of cognitive reasoning in children that has come to the fore 
over that period. Advances in the behavioural and neuro sciences show that setting an 
arbitrary age for attaching criminal liability is likely to penalise many children unfairly. 
Reviewing the literature, McDiarmid explains that the cognitive development necessary to 
integrate rational control over functioning with the level of skills and functional ability 
acquired are individual to the child.54 Not only does this argue against the universal 
application of a fixed age, but it also suggests that even twelve years of age may be too low 
as a generalisation.55 Although the Kennedy Report back in 1980 raised these issues in its 
analysis of juvenile crime, they have not had any impact on the ensuing debate, which has 
been dominated variously by: the need to bring the law into line with standards in the 
neighbouring jurisdictions, the benefits of diverting the child from the criminal process, 
placating the UN committee the rights of the child and ultimately a perceived need for strict 
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discipline as a primary tool to combat childhood offending. It would appear, therefore, that 
the case for reform is still as pressing in the Republic of Ireland as it is in its neighbouring 
jurisdictions.   
